Economic analysis of law posner pdf download

Assume also that the parties are risk neutral. Subsequently, standard asymmetric information models of settlement versus litigation were examined Bebchuk, ; Reinganum and Wilde, ; Schweizer, ; Spier, ; Hay and Spier, ; and Daughety, In a simple model of this type, there is one-sided asymmetry of information and the party without private information makes a take-it-or-leave-it settlement proposal. For example, the plaintiff makes a demand x to the defendant, who has private information about the probability p that he will lose at trial.

The plaintiff chooses x to maximize his expected payoff from settlement or trial. The higher his demand x, the more he will obtain if it is accepted, but the greater the likelihood of rejection and thus of his bearing trial costs. At the optimal demand for the plaintiff, there will generally be a positive probability of trial and also of settlement. The virtues of such asymmetric information models are twofold.

First, they include an explicit account of bargaining and thus of the probability of settlement and the magnitude of the settlement offer or demand. Second, the models explain differences of opinion that give rise to trial in terms of differences in possession of information. However, the models do not account for why there should be differences in information, given that the parties have incentives to share information and may be forced to do so through legal discovery.

The private and social incentive to settle generally diverge for several reasons. First, because the litigants do not bear all of the costs of a trial such as the salaries of judges and the forgone value of juror time , they save less by settling than society does, which tends to make the private incentive to settle socially inadequate.

But their desire to obtain from each other a greater share of the benefit from settling does not itself translate into any social benefit. Third, the prospect of settlement may reduce deterrence because defendants gain from settlement. Litigation expenditures. A plaintiff will continue spending on litigation as long as this raises his expected return from settlement or trial net of litigation costs , and a defendant will make such expenditures as long as this lowers his expected total outlays.

There are several reasons why the private and social incentives to spend on litigation diverge. First, to the extent that their expenditures simply offset each other, without altering trial or settlement outcomes, the expenditures constitute a social waste. Because private and social incentives to spend on litigation may diverge, it may be beneficial for expenditures to be either curtailed or encouraged.

In practice, courts often restrict the legal effort that parties can undertake, for example, by limiting the extent of discovery and the number of testifying experts. Other topics. Law enforcement often is the result of the efforts of public agents, such as inspectors, tax auditors, and police. We here discuss certain characteristics of optimal public law enforcement.

As noted, this subject was first analyzed by Bentham and Becker for a survey, see Polinsky and Shavell, Rationale for public enforcement. A basic question is why there is a need for public enforcement of law in the light of the availability of private suits brought by victims Becker and Stigler, ; Landes and Posner, ; Polinsky, The answer depends importantly on the locus of information about the identity of injurers.

When victims of harm naturally possess knowledge of the identity of injurers, allowing private suits for damages will motivate victims to sue and thus harness the information they have for purposes of law enforcement.

This may help to explain why the enforcement of contractual obligations and of accident law is primarily private. Basic framework for analyzing public enforcement. Suppose that if an individual commits a harmful act, he obtains a gain and also faces the risk of being caught and sanctioned. The sanction could be a fine or a prison term. Fines will be treated as socially costless because they are mere transfers of money, whereas imprisonment is socially costly because of the expense of operating prisons and the disutility suffered by those imprisoned which is not offset by gains to others.

The higher is the probability of detecting and sanctioning violators, the more resources the state must devote to enforcement.

If individuals are risk neutral, social welfare can be expressed as the gains individuals obtain from committing their harmful acts, less the harms caused, and less the costs of law enforcement. Suppose that the sanction is a fine and that individuals are risk neutral.

Then the optimal level of the fine is maximal, fM, as emphasized in Becker If the fine were not maximal, society could save enforcement costs by simultaneously raising the fine and lowering the probability without affecting the level of deterrence. Moreover, the optimal probability is such that there is some underdeterrence; in other words, at the optimal p, the expected fine pfM is less than the harm h.

If individuals are risk averse, the optimal fine may well below the maximal fine, as stressed in Polinsky and Shavell This is because the use of a very high fine would impose a substantial risk-bearing cost on individuals who commit harmful acts.

Now suppose that the sanction is imprisonment and that individuals are risk neutral in imprisonment. Then the optimal imprisonment term is maximal. The reasoning is similar to that employed above with respect to fines: if the imprisonment term were not maximal, it could be raised and the probability of detection lowered so as to keep the expected prison term constant; neither individual behavior nor the costs of imposing imprisonment are affected because the expected prison term is the same , but enforcement expenditures fall.

If, instead, individuals are risk averse in imprisonment the disutility of each additional year of imprisonment grows with the number of years in prison , there is a stronger argument for setting the imprisonment sanction maximally than when individuals are risk neutral.

Now, when the imprisonment term is raised, the probability of detection can be lowered even more than in the risk-neutral case without reducing deterrence.

Thus, not only are there greater savings in enforcement expenditures, but also the social costs of imposing imprisonment sanctions decline because the expected prison term falls. Last, suppose that individuals are risk preferring in imprisonment the disutility of each additional year of imprisonment declines with the number of years in prison.

This possibility seems particularly important: the first years of imprisonment may create unusually high disutility, due to brutalization of the prisoner or due to the stigma of having been imprisoned at all. In addition, individuals generally have positive time discount rates, which are thought to be especially significant for criminals.

Thus, although there would be enforcement cost savings, they might not be great enough to offset the increased sanctioning costs. Fines versus imprisonment.

Fines generally are preferable to prison terms as a means of deterrence, since fines are socially cheaper sanctions to impose Becker, Further, imprisonment should be used as a sanction only if the harm prevented by the added deterrence is sufficiently great. Fault-based liability. Our discussion so far has presumed that liability is strict, but liability may also be based on fault, an assessment of whether the act that caused harm was socially undesirable analogous to the negligence rule and due care standard discussed above in the accident context.

Fault-based liability, like strict liability, can induce individuals to behave properly, but fault-based liability possesses an advantage when individuals are risk averse: if they act responsibly, they will not be found at fault, so will not bear the risk of being sanctioned. Similarly, fault-based liability is advantageous when the form of the sanction is imprisonment, for then, again, individuals may be led to behave optimally without the actual imposition of sanctions, and thus without social costs being incurred Shavell, b.

To the extent that mistakes are made in determining fault, however, these two advantages are reduced because risk is imposed and sanctioning costs are incurred. Note, too, that fault-based liability is more difficult to implement, because it requires the state to determine optimal behavior.

Society may reduce harm not only through deterrence but also by imposing sanctions that remove parties from positions in which they are able to cause harm, that is, by incapacitating them. Suppose that the sole function of imprisonment is to incapacitate. Then it will be desirable to keep someone in jail as long as the reduction in crime from incapacitating him exceeds the costs of imprisonment Shavell, c. Although this condition could hold for a long period, it is unlikely to, unless the harm prevented is very high, because the proclivity to commit crimes apparently declines sharply with age.

Note that, as a matter of economic logic, the incapacitation rationale might imply that a person should be imprisoned even if he has not committed a crime — because the danger he poses to society makes incapacitating him worthwhile. In practice, however, the fact that a person has committed a harmful act may be the best basis for predicting his future behavior, in which case the incapacitation rationale would suggest imprisoning an individual only if he has committed such an act.

Two observations are worth noting about the relationship between optimal enforcement when incapacitation is the goal versus when deterrence is the goal. First, when enforcement is based on incapacitation, the optimal magnitude of the sanction is independent of the probability of apprehension, which contrasts with the case when enforcement is based on deterrence.

Second, when enforcement is deterrence-oriented, the probability and magnitude of sanctions depend on the ability to deter, and if this ability is limited as, for instance, with the insane , a low expected sanction may be optimal, whereas a high sanction still might be called for to incapacitate.

Other issues. Criminal law. The subject of criminal law may be viewed in the light of the theory of public law enforcement Posner, ; Shavell, First, the fact that the acts in the core area of crime robbery, murder, rape, and so forth are punished by the sanction of imprisonment makes basic sense.

Were society to rely on fines alone, deterrence of the acts in question would be grossly inadequate. Notably, the probability of detecting many of these acts is low, making the money sanction necessary for deterrence high, but the assets of individuals who commit these acts often are insubstantial. Hence, the threat of prison is needed for deterrence. Moreover, the incapacitative aspect of imprisonment is valuable because of the difficulty of deterring individuals who are prone to commit criminal acts.

Second, many of the doctrines of criminal law appear to enhance social welfare. This seems true of the basic feature of criminal law that punishment is not imposed on all harmful acts, but instead is usually confined to those that are undesirable.

For example, murder is subject to criminal sanctions, but not all accidental killing. As we have stressed, when the socially costly sanction of imprisonment is employed, the fault system is desirable because it results in less frequent imposition of punishment than strict liability. Also, the focus on intent in criminal law as a precondition for imposing sanctions may be sensible with regard to deterrence because those who intend to do harm are more likely to conceal their acts, and may be harder to discourage because of the benefits they anticipate.

That unsuccessful attempts to do harm are punished in criminal law is an implicit way of raising the likelihood of sanctions for undesirable acts. Study of specific doctrines of criminal law seems to afford a rich opportunity for economic analysis. Many observers, and particularly noneconomists, view economic analysis of law with skepticism. We consider several such criticisms here. Description of behavior.

It is sometimes claimed that individuals and firms do not respond to legal rules as rational maximizers of their well-being. The emerging field of behavioral economics, as well as work in various disciplines that address social norms, is beginning to examine these sorts of issues Jolls et al.

Distribution of income. A frequent criticism of economic analysis of law concerns its focus on efficiency, to the exclusion of the distribution of income. The claim of critics is that legal rules should be selected in a manner that takes into account their effects on the rich and the poor. But achieving sought-after redistribution through income tax and transfer programs tends to be superior to redistribution through the choice of legal rules.

Additionally, in contractual contexts, the choice of a legal rule often will not have any distributional effect because contract terms, notably, the price, will adjust so that any agreement into which parties enter will continue to reflect the initial distribution of bargaining power between them. Concerns for fairness. An additional criticism is that the conventional economic approach slights important concerns about fairness, justice, and rights.

Some of these notions refer implicitly to the appropriateness of the distribution of income and, accordingly, are encompassed by our preceding remarks. Also, to some degree, the notions are motivated by instrumental concerns. For example, the attraction of paying fair compensation to victims must derive in part from the beneficial risk reduction effected by such payments, and the appeal of obeying contractual promises must rest in part on the desirable consequences contract performance has on production and exchange.

However, many who promote fairness, justice, and rights do not regard these notions merely as some sort of proxy for attaining instrumental objectives. Instead, they believe that satisfying these notions is intrinsically valuable. This view also can be partially reconciled with the economic conception of social welfare: if individuals have a preference for a legal rule or institution because they regard it as fair, that should be credited in the determination of social welfare, just as any preference should.

Indeed, consistently pursuing any non-welfarist principle must sometimes result in everyone being made worse off; see Kaplow and Shavell , Efficiency of judge-made law. Also criticized is the contention of some economically- oriented legal academics, notably Posner , that judge-made law tends to be efficient in contrast to legislation, which is said to reflect the influence of special interest groups. Filling gaps in incomplete contracts: an economic theory of default rules. Yale Law Journal 99, Bebchuk, L.

Litigation and settlement under imperfect information. Pre-contractual reliance. Journal of Legal Studies 30, Becker, G. Crime and punishment: an economic approach. Journal of Political Economy 76, Law enforcement, malfeasance, and compensation of enforcers. Journal of Legal Studies 3, Bentham, J. Blume, L. The taking of land: when should compensation be paid?

Quarterly Journal of Economics 99, Bolton, P. Contract Theory. Brown, J. Toward an economic theory of liability. Journal of Legal Studies 2, Calabresi, G. New Haven: Yale University Press. Property rules, liability rules, and inalienability: one view of the cathedral.

Harvard Law Review 85, Coase, R. The problem of social cost. Journal of Law and Economics 3, Cooter, R. Law and Economics, 4th ed.

Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley. Craswell, R. Offer, acceptance, and efficient reliance. Stanford Law Review 48, Encyclopedia of Law and Economics, Bouckaert, B. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar. Daughety, A. Appealing judgments. Demsetz, H. Toward a theory of property rights.

American Economic Review: Papers and Proceedings 57, Diamond, P. Single activity accidents. An equilibrium analysis of search and breach of contract, I: steady states.

Bell Journal of Economics 10, Hadfield, G. Judicial competence and the interpretation of incomplete contracts. Journal of Legal Studies 23, Hart, O.

Incomplete contracts. New York: Macmillan Press. Incomplete contracts and renegotiation. Econometrica 56, Hay, B. Settlement of litigation. London: Macmillan. Innes, R. Remediation and self-reporting in optimal law enforcement. Journal of Public Economics 72, Jolls, C. A behavioral approach to law and economics. Stanford Law Review 50, Kaplow, L. An economic analysis of legal transitions. Harvard Law Review 99, The value of accuracy in adjudication: an economic analysis.

Optimal law enforcement with self-reporting of behavior. Journal of Political Economy , Why the legal system is less efficient than the income tax in redistributing income.

Any non-welfarist method of policy assessment violates the Pareto principle. Fairness versus Welfare. Katz, A. The strategic structure of offer and acceptance: game theory and the law of contract formation. Michigan Law Review 89, When should an offer stick? The economics of promissory estoppel in preliminary negotiations.

Yale Law Journal , Kronman, A. Mistake, disclosure, information, and the law of contracts. Journal of Legal Studies 7, Landes, W. The private enforcement of law. Journal of Legal Studies 4, The Economic Structure of Tort Law. Trademark law: an economic perspective.

Journal of Law and Economics 30, Libecap, G. Property rights in economic history: implications for research. Explorations in Economic History 23, New York: Oxford University Press. Mookherjee, D. American Economic Review 82, Png, I.

Optimal subsidies and damages in the presence of judicial error. International Review of Law and Economics 6, Polinsky, A. Private versus public enforcement of fines. Journal of Legal Studies 9, Risk sharing through breach of contract remedies. Journal of Legal Studies 12, The optimal tradeoff between the probability and magnitude of fines. American Economic Review 69, The economic theory of public enforcement of law. Journal of Economic Literature 38, Corruption and optimal law enforcement.

Journal of Public Economics 81, Handbook of Law and Economics, vol. Amsterdam: Elsevier. Posner, R. Economic Analysis of Law. Boston: Little, Brown and Company. An economic theory of the criminal law. Columbia Law Review 85, Economic Analysis of Law, 6th ed. New York: Aspen Publishers. Priest, G. The selection of disputes for litigation.

Journal of Legal Studies 13, Plea bargaining and prosecutorial discretion, American Economic Review 78, Reinganum, J.

Settlement, litigation, and the allocation of litigation costs. Rogerson, W. Efficient reliance and damage measures for breach of contract. Rose-Ackerman, S. Corruption and Government: Causes, Consequences and Reform.

New York: Cambridge University Press. Schwartz, A. Relational contracts in the courts: an analysis of incomplete agreements and judicial strategies. Journal of Legal Studies 21, Schweizer, U. Litigation and settlement under two-sided incomplete information.

Review of Economic Studies 56, Shavell, S. Bell Journal of Economics 11, Strict liability versus negligence. A note on efficiency vs. American Economic Review: Papers and Proceedings 71, On liability and insurance. Bell Journal of Economics 13, The social versus the private incentive to bring suit in a costly legal system. Journal of Legal Studies 11, Criminal law and the optimal use of nonmonetary sanctions as a deterrent.

Economic Analysis of Accident Law. The optimal use of nonmonetary sanctions as a deterrent. American Economic Review 77, A model of optimal incapacitation. American Economic Review: Papers and Proceedings 77, Sharing of information prior to settlement or litigation.

Specific versus general enforcement of law. Journal of Political Economy 99, The optimal structure of law enforcement. Journal of Law and Economics 36, Acquisition and disclosure of information prior to sale. The appeals process as a means of error correction. Journal of Legal Studies 24, The fundamental divergence between the private and the social motive to use the legal system.

Journal of Legal Studies 26, Foundations of Economic Analysis of Law. On the writing and interpretation of contracts. Shleifer, A. Quarterly Journal of Economics , Spier, K. The dynamics of pretrial negotiation. Review of Economic Studies 59, Mediasi atau Arbitrase telah berkembang di berbagai Negara seperti antara lain dijelaskan oleh Atja Sanjaja. Berhubung pernyataan pailit terhadap debitor itu harus melalui proses pengadilan melalui fase-fase pemeriksaan maka segala sesuatu yang menyangkut tentang peristiwa pailit itu disebut kepailitan.

Ketidakmampuan tersebut harus disertai dengan suatu tindakan nyata untuk mengajukan, baik yang dilakukan secara sukarela oleh debitor sendiri, maupun atas permintaan pihak ketiga diluar debitor , suatu permohonan pailit ke pengadilan. Maksud dari pengajuan permohonan tersebut adalah sebagai suatu bentuk pemenuhan asas publisitas dari keadaan tidak mampu membayar dari seorang debitor. Tanpa adanya permohonan tersebut kepengadilan, maka pihak ketiga yang berkepentingan tidak akan pernah tahu keadaan tidak mampu membayar dari debitor.

Keadaan ini kemudian akan diperkuat dengan suatu putusan pernyataan oleh hakim pengadilan, baik itu yang merupakan putusan yang mengabulkan ataupun menolak permohoan kepailitan yang diajukan.

Hukum Kepailitan Edisi Revisi Cet. Malang: UMM Press h. Sita umum mencakup seluruh kekayaan debitur untuk kepentingan semua kriditur. Tujuan kepailitan adalah pembagian kekayaan debitur oleh kurator kepada semua kriditur dengan memperhatikan hak masing-masing kreditur secara adil.

Dengan adanya putusan pernyataan pailit berlaku pula ketentuan pasal Kitab Undang Undang Hukum Perdata atas seluruh harta kekayaan debitur pailit yang berlaku umum bagi semua kreditur konkuren dalam kepailitan. Pernyataan pailit oleh Pengadilan Niaga haruslah adanya permohonan dengan persyaratan yang telah diatur di dalam Undang-Undang.

Jakarta: Indonesia Legal Center Publishing for law and justice reform h. Anton Suyatno,S. Pemanfaatan Penundaan Kewajiban Pembayaran Utang. Kencana Prenada Media Group. Jakarta hal Salah satunya adalah dengan mengajukan penundaan kewajiban pembayaran utang disingkat PKPU atau Surseance van Betaling menurut istilah Faillissementsverordening atau Suspension of Payment menurut istilah dalam bahasa Inggris.

Tujuan pengajuan PKPU menurut Pasal ayat 2 Undang-Undang Nomor 37 Tahun tentang Kepailitan dan Penundaan Kewajiban Pembayaran Utang adalah untuk mengajukan rencana perdamaian yang meliputi tawaran pembayaran sebagian atau seluruh utang kepada kreditor. Menurut Penjelasan Pasal ayat 2 Undang-Undang Nomor 37 Tahun tentang Kepailitan dan Penundaan Kewajiban Pembayaran Utang, yang dimaksud dengan kreditor adalah baik kreditor konkuren maupun kreditor yang didahulukan.

Cara yang kedua yang dapat ditempuh oleh debitor agar harta kekayaannya terhindar dari likuidasi adalah mengadakan perdamaian antara debitor dengan para kreditornya setelah debitor dinyatakan pailit oleh pengadilan. Ketiga, Pustaka Utama Grafiti, Jakarta, , h. Jika hal tersebut dapat terlaksana dengan baik, pada akhirnya debitor dapat memenuhi kewajiban- kewajibannya dan meneruskan usahanya. Dalam hal permohonan diajukan oleh debitor, pengadilan dalam waktu paling lambat 3 tiga hari sejak tanggal didaftarkannya permohonan harus mengabulkan penundaan kewajiban pembayaran utang sementara dan harus menunjuk seorang hakim pengawas dari hakim pengadilan serta mengangkat 1 satu atau lebih pengurus yang bersama dengan debitor mengurus harta debitor.

Tugas hakim pengawas dalam penundaan kewajiban pembayaran utang mirip dengan tugas hakim pengawas dalam kepailitan. Pengurus yang diangkat harus independen dan tidak memiliki benturan kepentingan dengan debitor atau kreditor.

Sejak diangkatnya seorang atau lebih pengurus, maka serta-merta kekayaan debitor berada di bawah pengawasan pengurus. Jangka waktu PKPU tetap yang diputuskan oleh pengadilan niaga berikut perpanjangannya tidak boleh melebihi dua ratus tujuh puluh hari terhitung sejak putusan PKPU sementara diucapkan.

Pihak yang berhak untuk menentukan apakah kepada debitor akan diberikan PKPU tetap adalah kreditor konkuren, sedangkan pengadilan hanya berwenang menetapkannya berdasarkan persetujuan kreditor konkuren. Pada umumnya permohonan penundaan kewajiban pembayaran utang yang diajukan oleh debitor selalu diikuti dengan rencana perdamaian yang diajukan oleh debitor sendiri. Rencana perdamaian tersebut adalah suatu tahap final dan sangat penting dalam proses penundaan kewajiban pembayaran utang, sebab apabila rencana perdamaian tersebut tidak selesai dan 41 Rudy A.

Sanksi Permasalahan yang dapat menimbulkan inefisiensi adalah ketidakharmonisan antara satu peraturan perundang-undangan dengan peraturan perundang-undangan lainnya. Dalam hal ini dapat dikemukakan misalnya adanya ketentuan hukum yang menyimpang dari prinsip pokok pengembangan lembaga non-litigasi, terutama kewajiban pengadilan untuk menolak perkara dimana para pihak sendiri telah memilih penyelesaian secara non-litigasi.

Ketentuan tersebut tampak pada ketentuan Pasal 45 ayat 4 Undang-undang No. Seyogyamya bila upaya penyelesaian di luar pengadilan telah dipilih oleh para pihak, upaya tersebut harus dilalui sebagaimana mestinya, dan pengadilan wajib untuk menolak gugatannya.

Ketentuan Pasal 3 Undang-undang No. Contoh lain ketidakharmonisan antar peraturan perundang- undangan yang dapat menimbulkan inefisiensi adalah mengenai wajib simpan dokumen perusahaan. Pasal 11 ayat 1 Undang-undang No. Namun berhadapan dengan ketentuan mengenai daluarsa, pembaruan jangka waktu tersebut menjadi tidak berarti. Sehingga pilihan untuk memaksimalisasi efisiensi ruang, waktu dan biaya dalam pemeliharaan dokumen dengan kemungkinan memusnahkannya setelah lewat waktu 10 tahun, berhadapan dengan kemungkinan kerugian yang lebih besar yang akan timbul dari proses pembuktian di pengadilan.

Apalagi bila hal tersebut ditambah dengan kekakuan pengadilan dalam menerima bukti yang hanya berupa bukti-bukti tertulis saja, sehingga pengalihan dokumen perusahaan dalam bentuk paperless media yang juga dimungkinkan berda-sarkan Pasal 12 Undang-undang Dokumen Perusahaan akan semakin memperburuk kondisi inefisiensi.

Pembahasan Putusan-Putusan Pengadilan Sebagai salah satu unsur dalam sistem peradilan hakim memiliki posisi dan peran penting, apalagi dengan segala kewenangan yang dimiliki. Oleh karena itu tugas dan wewenang yang dimiliki hakim harus dilaksanakan dalam kerangka penegakan hukum, kebenaran dan keadilan sesuai peraturan perundang-undangan maupun kode etik dengan memperhatikan prinsip equality before the law.

Beberapa waktu terakhir, hukum Indonesia bergejolak, pasalnya salah satu hakim agung, yakni Yamani diduga memalsukan putusan peninjauan kembali seorang terpidana Narkoba Pasal 97 menyatakan bahwa: Mahkamah Agung dalam tingkat kasasi dilarang a membuat putusan yang melanggar UU.

Pasal ini menunjukkan sangat kuat dipengaruhi oleh pemikiran legal positive. Untuk mencapai efisiensi, hakim agung harus bisa berpikir lebih jauh dari UU sebab produk UU adalah produk baku yang terjadi berdasarkan situasi tertentu dengan analisis kemungkinan tertentu pada masa yang akan datang.

Karena itu, jika hal ini tidak dipangkas, efisiensi yang diutamakan untuk mencapai keadilan sosial akan sulit dicapai. Dengan demikian, berdasarkan putusan Pengadilan Negeri Tangerang No. Tng tanggal 4 Februari , terdakwa kemudian dijatuhi hukuman mati.

Terdakwa kemudian mengajukan peninjauan kembali dalam masa-masa menanti pelaksanaan eksekusi mati, pihak pemohon pun mengajukan novum baru untuk meyakinkan hakim agung. Adapun alasan yang diajukan para pemohon terhadap PK tersebut antara lain: 1. Ditemukannya novum baru yang meringankan keterkaitan Hilary dengan gembong narkoba lain, yakni Marlena, Izuchukwu Okoloaja dan Kholisan Nkomo.

Pada saat kasasi, Marlena dan Okoloaja telah meninggal dalam masa penjara. Bahkan pemohon PK menuduh bahwa kematian kedua terpidana itu karena pihak penyidik melakukan intimidasi agar memberikan keterangan palsu terhadap pemohon PK.

Lagi pula, oknum Okoloaja yang dianggap pihak kepolisian sebagai nama lain alias dari Kholisan Nkomo ternyata tidak benar.

Kepolisian Nigeria menyebutkan bahwa Nkomo yang adalah pengedar narkoba masih hidup di Nigeria dan tercatat sedang mengalami masalah kriminal dengan kepolisian RI. Dengan demikian, BAP yang dibuat Okoloaja alias Nkomo dalam pikiran Penyidik tidak dapat dibenarkan karena subjek hukum ternyata bukan satu orang melainkan dua orang, sehingga kemungkinan akan adanya rekayasa BAP akan semakin besar.

Mengingat banyak negara Eropa yang memikirkan ulang tentang hukuman mati, pihak pemohon pun mengajukan hal tersebut sebagai salah satu pertimbang untuk meringankan vonis hukumannya. Terdakwa ditahan oleh kepolisian Banjarmasi sejak tanggal 29 Desember saat ia tertangkap tangan memperoleh kiriman yang berisi lebih dari 5 kilogram jenis shabu-shabu dan heroin di tempatnya, di alamat Putra Jaya Motor kabupaten Banjar.

Padu 29 September , tuntutan ini dikabulkan majelis hakim Pengadilan Negeri Banjarmasin dengan hukuman 17 tahun penjara. Namun, ketika ia melakukan banding pada tingkat kasasi, Mahkamah Agung RI mengabulkan seluruh permohonan terdakwa bahkan langsung memberikan pembebasan terhadap Liong-Liong.

Kiriman yang diperoleh oleh Liong-Liong diperoleh dari Jakarta tanpa nama pengirim dan ditujukan kepada A Liong dengan alamatnya. Bahkan daftar alamat penerima juga tidak tepat. Mencurigai adanya kiriman yang aneh, pihak bea cukai yang juga termasuk staf BNN Banjarmasin langsung menghubungi sesama tim penyidik untuk melakukan penggeledahan, termasuk pembongkaran terhadap kiriman terdakwa. Pihak penyidik kemudian menyamar sebagai petugas pengirim barang, sampai kemudian mereka menangkap Liong-Liong.

Polisi diduga telah melakukan rekayasa. Pembukaan barang kiriman adalah kecerobohan pihak penyidik. Di tempat Liong-Liong maupun rumahnya, tidak ditemukan barang bukti sejenis narkotika dan psikotropika. Bahkan setelah dilakukan pemeriksaan, Liong tidak teridentifikasi sebagai pengguna narkoba. Aadanya surat perintah penyelidikan yang dilakukan beberapa hari sebelum kasus itu terjadi. Padahal, penyelidikan dibuat jika sudah ada kasus yang terkuak. Liong merasa dirinya menjadi korban rekayasa pihak kepolisian yang berusaha mengalihkan kasus karena sudah terlanjur salah.

Selain itu, ada iming-iming kenaikan pangkat, membuat polisi dan penyidik berusaha sedemikian rupa terdakwa mengakui tindakannya. Kesimpulan Berdasarkan pembahasan diatas, maka kesimpulan penulisan makalah ini adalah sebagaimana berikut : 1. Kemudian untuk menelesaikan sengketa bisnis ekonomi syariah melalui jalur pengadilan litigasi maupun di luar pengadilan non litigasi.

Economic Analysis of Law Dalam Penyelesaian Sengketa Bisnis dibutuhkan dalam rangka mencapai efisiensi, baik melalui prosedur litigasi maupun non litigasi. Kaitannya dengan Economic Analysis of Law Pada Pemberian PKPU Tetap Dalam Perkara Kepailitan, Ada dua cara yang disediakan oleh Undang-Undang Nomor 37 Tahun tentang Kepailitan dan Penundaan Kewajiban Pembayaran Utang, agar debitor terhindar dari ancaman harta kekayaannya dilikuidasi ketika debitor telah atau akan berada dalam keadaan insolven dalam rangka merestrukturisasi utangutangnya sehingga debitor berkemungkinan untuk melanjutkan usahanya serta dapat memberi suatu jaminan bagi pelunasan utang-utang debitor kepada seluruh kreditor, Salah satunya adalah dengan mengajukan penundaan kewajiban pembayaran utang disingkat PKPU.

Dasar pemikiran PKPU adalah pemberian kesempatan kepada debitor untuk melakukan restrukturisasi utang-utangnya yang dapat meliputi pembayaran seluruh atau sebagian utang kepada kreditor konkuren. Permasalahan yang terjadi yaitu ketidakharmonisan antara satu peraturan perundang-undangan dengan peraturan perundang-undangan lainnya. Ini menyebabkan inefisiensi, oleh karena itu dalam konteks perundang- undangan harus memenuhi efisiensi untuk memenuhi kepastian hukum yang efektif dan efisien.

Hakim memiliki peran penting dalam penyelesaian sengketa maupun kasus baik pidana maupun perdata. Kaitannya dengan putusan hakim yang kontroversial terjadi dikarenakan beberapa sebab, baik motivasi untuk melakukan KKN maupun faktor laiinya. Contohnya adalah terjadi pada hakim agung, yakni Yamani diduga memalsukan putusan peninjauan kembali seorang terpidana Narkoba. Asikin, Zainal. Bushan J. Jakarta: t. Faoutoucos, A. Goodpaster, Garr. Jakarta: Ghalia Indonesia, Hartini,Rahayu.

Malang: UMM Press, Hartono, Darminto. Lontoh, Rudy A. Mubarok, Jaih. Hukum Ekonomi Syariah — Akad Mudharabah.